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A
s biological research and its applica-
tions rapidly evolve, new attempts at 
the governance of biology are emerg-
ing, challenging traditional assump-
tions about how science works and 
who is responsible for governing. 
However, these governance approaches often 
are not evaluated, analyzed, or compared. 
This hinders the building of a cumulative 
base of experience and opportunities for 
learning. Consider “biosecurity governance,” 
a term with no internationally agreed defini-
tion, here defined as the processes that influ-
ence behavior to prevent or deter misuse of 
biological science and technology. Changes 
in technical, social, and political environ-
ments, coupled with the emergence of natu-
ral diseases such as coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19), are testing existing governance 
processes. This has led some communities to 
look beyond existing biosecurity models, poli-
cies, and procedures. But without systematic 
analysis and learning across them, it is hard 
to know what works. We suggest that activi-
ties focused on rethinking biosecurity gover-
nance present opportunities to “experiment” 
with new sets of assumptions about the rela-
tionship among biology, security, and society, 
leading to the development, assessment, and 
iteration of governance hypotheses.
Traditional international biosecurity 
efforts have focused largely on risk man-
agement (i.e., addressing accidental and 
deliberate risks from pathogens and tox-
ins) and dual-use research (i.e., potential 
malicious exploitation of knowledge, skills, 
and technology). These efforts assume that 
we already know what to worry about (lists 
of known pathogens and toxins) and how 
to govern it (access control), even if orga-
nizations implementing biosecurity recog-
nize the shortcomings and limitations of 
these assumptions (1).
In the past decade, however, our ability 
to manipulate living organisms and entire 
genomes has advanced rapidly through the 
development of tools such as CRISPR, mod-
ern sequencing techniques, and genome 
synthesis and assembly approaches. This 
has allowed us to generate microbes, cell 
types, animals, plants, materials, and tools 
(e.g., gene drives), all of which have elicited 
security concerns. Moreover, concern about 
state and non-state actor weaponization of 
biology continues (2–4). The following ex-
amples show how new approaches to gov-
ernance, although innovative, are currently 
sporadic and often ad hoc responses to par-
ticular security deficiencies.
After heated debate about two experi-
ments involving the identification of spe-
cific mutations in H5N1 avian influenza 
that enable spread between mammals, the 
U.S. government developed policies on re-
view and oversight of dual-use research of 
concern (DURC), requesting federal fund-
ing agencies and institutions to review, 
modify, and/or oversee certain research. 
Under the assumption that such oversight 
would be implemented only if minimally 
invasive, the policies restricted oversight 
to a subset of work on a subset of known 
pathogens and experimentally derived 
traits. Recognizing that these policies still 
focus on known pathogens and do not ad-
dress risks from modification of respiratory 
pathogens, the United States developed an 
additional policy focused instead on post-
experiment attributes of an organism in 
2017. This Potential Pandemic Pathogen 
Care and Oversight policy was also the first 
to consider under which conditions such 
research is ethical. Regular and systematic 
review of these policies is essential (5) but 
currently ad hoc. 
A decade ago, the U.S. Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) Biological Counter-
measures Unit decided that countering po-
tential biosecurity events required staying 
abreast of advances in biology and engaging 
closely with the life science research commu-
nity, including universities, companies, and 
the emerging do-it-yourself (DIY) community 
labs. This meant building internal scientific 
expertise and community liaison capacity, 
both of which were contrary to the public’s 
image of the FBI and how it operates (6). 
Moreover, these efforts called on scientists 
to take responsibility for identifying and ad-
dressing potential security concerns.
The American Biological Safety Association 
(ABSA) International observed that biosafety 
professionals have been increasingly asked 
to assess security in addition to safety as-
pects of research, but do not know how to 
assess security concerns, and, perhaps more 
important, how to think about malicious in-
tent and intentional release. ABSA concluded 
that further training would improve security 
and promote common biosecurity practices 
throughout the scientific community through 
educational opportunities and development 
of a global biosecurity credential (7).
We do not have perfect knowledge of the 
ways that biology might be used by mali-
cious actors, or of the best ways to prevent 
such uses. No a priori reason exists to be-
lieve that our original assumptions and 
hypotheses are optimal. The consequences 
of getting assumptions wrong, such as a 
pandemic caused by a laboratory-derived 
pathogen, are among the strongest argu-
ments for testing a wide range of assump-
tions in ways that can provide signals of ef-
fectiveness prior to catastrophic events. 
An experimental approach focuses atten-
tion on the need to be systematic and open 
about analyzing the limitations of existing 
systems and promoting actions that ad-
dress or work around them. It also means 
developing better methods to collect data 
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to evaluate the effectiveness of governance, 
coupled with data sharing across current 
and future experiments. These meta-level 
discussions are key for any robust and 
adaptive governance system (8, 9).
The experimental metaphor does have 
some limitations. Security governance strat-
egies are designed not to fail catastrophi-
cally, and governance has many actors in-
volved in design and implementation. Our 
use of “experiment” is best understood 
in terms of deliberate social experiments 
around the introduction of new technology 
and policy, where the focus is on uncer-
tainty, lack of control, and systematic learn-
ing (10). This approach places the concept 
closer to a design-build-test cycle, but with 
the focus on governing in a complex adap-
tive space, not on controlling the system.
GOVERNANCE AS AN EXPERIMENT
One current experimental governance ap-
proach is the International Genetically 
Engineered Machine (iGEM) Foundation’s 
Safety and Security Program. iGEM runs 
a yearly competition for around 6000 stu-
dents and community biolab members from 
more than 40 countries. Each year, iGEM 
generates a set of hypotheses about how 
 proposed changes in safety and security 
governance of the competition might affect 
teams and lead to better oversight, and re-
views cases that tested—or previously were 
not caught by—its system. Through these 
reviews, iGEM recognized that processes 
for screening teams’ genetic sequences 
for known pathogens both provided false 
positives and missed work with potential 
security implications beyond issues with 
known pathogens. This lesson led iGEM to 
transition to a function-based, rather than 
sequence-based, screening architecture. 
This new approach is part of iGEM’s com-
mitment to a multi-tiered, iterative security 
program that seeks to address an adaptive 
and expanding range of concerns (11). 
Thinking about biosecurity governance 
as an experiment focuses attention on 
several often underappreciated aspects of 
governance. One of these is the set of as-
sumptions we make in the process of gov-
erning, most notably about the structure 
of science, governing authorities, and their 
relations to specific security conceptions. 
These assumptions tend to come in pack-
ages. For example, the use of a system of 
export controls relies on an assumption 
that science consists of discrete knowledge 
entities (e.g., published articles or biologi-
cal specimens), restricting the export of 
which enhances security. It also relies on 
seeing threats as likely originating abroad, 
as opposed to, say, within labs in a country 
(i.e., an insider threat). 
Another example is the assumption that 
scientists are best placed to govern them-
selves, which is at the heart of the DURC 
policies, despite scientists not necessarily 
having training to identify security risks. 
This assumption is so firmly rooted in bio-
security governance that questioning it is 
difficult, and even when it is questioned, 
gathering evidence to inform governance 
redesign is challenging (12). However, sci-
entists may have the requisite knowledge 
to identify measures for assessing and 
reducing identified risks. In drawing out 
these assumptions and comparing them 
across experiments, we can understand 
more systematically the contexts in which 
they are likely to hold and where experi-
ments based on different assumptions 
might be more informative. 
A further underappreciated aspect of 
governance is its iterative and evolving na-
ture. Governance processes and the stake-
holder communities continually renew, in 
response to both changing technological ca-
pabilities and changing community and so-
cietal conditions. We can take advantage of 
this to learn from past governance experi-
ments. Currently, learning from governance 
experiments usually occurs through ad hoc 
meetings and publications originating from 
an organic desire to share experiences or 
from a broader strategy to create space to 
talk about lived experiences, such as the 
ABSA Distance Learning Committee. 
LEARNING ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
Organizations that fund life science work, 
oversee it, set or carry out policy regarding 
it, or engage in it (as researchers, citizens, 
or other interested parties) may want to 
experiment with different ways of under-
standing what counts as a security concern 
and what should be done about it. In the 
spirit of learning across experiments, we of-
fer several initial lessons.
In designing a governance experiment, 
consideration should be given to framing 
the proposed set of actions in terms of hy-
potheses, which in turn are based on a set 
of assumptions about the science, security 
concerns, and the governing authorities. 
For example, early presentations given to 
biotechnology-related groups by the FBI 
Biological Countermeasures Unit clearly re-
flected an assumption that biosecurity was 
different from nuclear or chemical security 
because pathogens already exist in the en-
vironment, and because research into them 
is conducted by various sectors for numer-
ous beneficial reasons and at different scales 
throughout the world. The proposed solu-
tion was a governing structure that mirrored 
this dispersed scientific environment, one 
that was collaborative rather than top-down. 
Although the FBI gathered baseline data on 
scientists’ views of law enforcement to in-
form its outreach activities (13), measuring 
the effectiveness and outcomes of the activi-
ties could have been enhanced if the FBI had 
considered this proposed solution as a hy-
pothesis and developed a set of metrics to be 
able to assess, from the beginning, whether 
 The FBI’s presentation at an annual 
iGEM Jamboree exemplifies its 
experimentation with a collaborative 
approach to biosecurity governance. 
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such hypotheses held up, and if not, what 
might need changing. This lesson might in-
volve, for example, structured feedback from 
community labs about FBI engagement, and 
routinized sharing across field offices of 
standard procedures for developing commu-
nity relationships. Working with social sci-
entists who can help to identify assumptions 
and develop alternatives that might better 
align with the goals of governance could be 
helpful in designing and documenting these 
experiments in governance (14).
Developing a capacity to quickly identify 
difficult or unanticipated cases allows for 
governing processes to adapt and account 
for them. To the extent possible, sharing 
case studies—including both failures and 
“near misses”—in a timely fashion could 
aid other biosecurity processes greatly. 
iGEM developed this capacity and quickly 
put it to work when a 2016 student team 
claimed to be developing a gene drive. 
After working closely with the team and 
experts to understand exactly what was 
and was not accomplished, iGEM became 
one of the first places to produce a policy 
on gene drives. It then wrote up its lessons 
learned and shared them with the wider 
biosecurity community.
Learning involves connecting with com-
munities that have tried similar experi-
ments and could build on earlier results. 
These groups range from networks of com-
munity biolabs to international efforts such 
as the Global Health Security Agenda’s ac-
tion package on biosafety and biosecurity. 
Two examples of connecting communities 
are the leadership programs through the 
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security 
(Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Initiative) 
and Stanford University [Synthetic Biology 
Leadership Excellence Accelerator Program 
(LEAP)], both of which provide opportuni-
ties for policy experts and/or scientists to 
learn about biosecurity concerns and ap-
proaches for addressing those concerns 
within their networks. Additionally, spe-
cific fora such as the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts, 
or non-state venues such as the ABSA 
International Biosecurity Symposium, pro-
vide opportunities for stakeholders to en-
gage in biosecurity governance. Developing 
communication across communities means 
addressing barriers to communication, such 
as industrial considerations of competition 
sensitivity, governmental controls (e.g., ex-
port restriction, classification), and differ-
ing terminology.
Taking a structured approach to experi-
mental design, periodically reassessing, 
and cooperating may seem like simple 
steps to take, but our collective experi-
ence suggests that biosecurity efforts over 
the past two decades—from promoting 
self-governance to requiring oversight of 
pathogen research—have largely not taken 
these steps. They require thinking beyond 
the current crisis, testing design choices 
(e.g., the use of lists), and being willing and 
able to rethink basic assumptions, such as 
the idea that both science and security are 
things that can be governed in isolation 
from other aspects of society.
An immediate step to expand and revise 
these lessons is for philanthropies, govern-
ments, and others to fund a review of ex-
isting biosecurity governance experiments, 
with the aim of determining how they are 
being implemented in practice. The find-
ings from such a review could be integrated 
into policy redesign and could inform net-
works of biosecurity practitioners. Such a 
review also would focus on industries and 
regions of the world that have little to no 
current biosecurity governance in place. 
The industrial and commercial develop-
ment of biology represents a substantial 
amount of biological research and innova-
tion. Industrial organizations have consid-
erable influence on state governance deci-
sions, and in addition they are trying out 
biosecurity governance themselves through 
efforts such as sequence screening in the 
International Gene Synthesis Consortium, 
which might benefit from a more experi-
mental design. For many regions of the 
world without biosecurity governance, get-
ting basic oversight capacity in place is al-
ready a major challenge.
The biosecurity community should es-
tablish and strengthen shared resources 
to help groups wishing to establish new 
governance systems for their communities, 
such as the Analytical Approach for the 
Development of a National Biosafety and 
Biosecurity System, published by the Public 
Health Agency of Canada. It also should 
strengthen resources for cooperation and 
learning across regions of the world, such as 
the International Network on Biotechnology 
run by the United Nations Interregional 
Crime and Justice Research Institute.
Publicly discussing specific instances of 
biosecurity concern that our governance 
systems do not cover can itself be an in-
formation hazard, but the processes of bio-
security governance may be less of a hazard 
to discuss. Institutions have many reasons 
beyond security (such as reputational and 
intellectual property risks) to not share 
information, and we encourage the explo-
ration of options to discuss these more 
sensitive issues. A particularly important 
challenge is enabling the safe migration of 
useful lessons between more restricted en-
vironments (e.g., classified facilities, indus-
trial operations) and less restricted environ-
ments (e.g., the DIY community). Sharing 
an evidence base that describes what has 
and has not worked is a necessary aspect 
of developing biosecurity governance that 
simultaneously reduces risk and promotes 
scientific progress (15).
At present, no capability for systematic 
learning about the effectiveness and limi-
tations of current biosecurity governance 
exists. If we can come to understand gover-
nance as an experimental space, we will be 
able to make more than sporadic movement 
past reactive approaches, and thus protect 
our economic vitality, academic freedom, 
and the health and security of our states, 
people, and environment. j
REFERENCES AND NOTES
 1.  D. DiEuliis, V. Rao, E. A. Billings, C. B. Meyer, K. Berger, 
Health Secur. 17, 83 (2019). 
 2.  C. McLeish, D. Feakes, Sci. Public Policy 35, 5 (2008).
 3.  L. Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror: How Experts 
Invented “Terrorism” (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013).
 4.  National Security Strategy of the United States (The 
White House, 2017).
 5.  Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, 
Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life 
Sciences (National Academies Press, 2006).
 6.  S. Tocchetti, S. A. Aguiton, Sci. Technol. Human Values 
40, 825 (2015).
 7.  R. L. Moritz, K. M. Berger, B. R. Owen, D. R. Gillum, 
Science 367, 856 (2020). 
 8.  M. J. Palmer, F. Fukuyama, D. A. Relman, Science 350, 
1471 (2015). 
 9.  F. Daviter, in Learning in Public Policy: Analysis, Modes 
and Outcomes, C. A. Dunlop, C. M. Radaelli, P. Trein, Eds. 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 145–165.
 10.  I. van de Poel, D. C. Mehos, L. Asveld, in New Perspectives 
on Technology in Society: Experimentation Beyond the 
Laboratory, I. van de Poel, L. Asveld, D. C. Mehos, Eds. 
(Routledge, 2018), pp. 1–15.
 11.  P. Millett et al., Appl. Biosaf. 24, 64 (2019).
 12.  B. Rappert, Front. Public Health 2, 74 (2014). 
 13.  N. Hafer et al., Sci. Progress (February 2009); www.
scienceprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/
how_scientists_view_law_enforcement.pdf.
 14.  A. S. Balmer et al., Sci. Technol. Stud. 28, 3 (2015).
 15.  National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine, Governance of Dual Use Research in the Life 
Sciences: Advancing Global Consensus on Research 
Oversight: Proceedings of a Workshop (National 
Academies Press, 2018).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors 
and not of any institutions with which they may be affiliated. 
This document does not contain technology or technical 
data controlled under either U.S. International Traffic in 
Arms Regulation or U.S. Export Administration Regulations. 
We thank participants of the Novel Practices in Biosecurity 
Governance workshop organized by S.W.E. at the University 
of Cambridge in July 2019 through the Biosecurity Research 
Initiative at St. Catharine’s (BioRISC) and the Centre for 
the Study of Existential Risk (CSER). The workshop was 
supported with funding from the Hauser-Raspe Workshop 
Series. S.W.E. was supported by a Schmidt Futures grant and 
the Templeton World Charity Foundation. J.L.J. and M.J.P. 
were supported by the Open Philanthropy Project. N.G.-R. 
was supported by the Future Innovation Fund. D.R.G. is the 
2020 president of ABSA. S.W.E. and M.J.P. are on iGEM’s 
Safety and Security Committee and LEAP. M.W.J.v.P. recently 
stepped down as Chair of Action Package 3 for the Global 
Health Security Agenda (GHSA). K.B. serves as deputy chair 
of the GHSA Consortium. G.H. sits on the Biosafety Strategic 
Leadership Group. N.J.H. runs the Joint Genome Institute 
extended screening for synthetic biology funding distribution.
10.1126/science.aba2932
Published by AAAS
o
n
 June 9, 2020
 
http://science.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Embrace experimentation in biosecurity governance
Geneviève Lacroix, Rebecca Moritz, Seán S. ÓhÉigeartaigh, Megan J. Palmer and Mark W. J. van Passel
Natàlia Garcia-Reyero, David R. Gillum, Graeme Harkess, Nathan J. Hillson, Petra A. M. Hogervorst, Jacob L. Jordan, 
Sam Weiss Evans, Jacob Beal, Kavita Berger, Diederik A. Bleijs, Alessia Cagnetti, Francesca Ceroni, Gerald L. Epstein,
DOI: 10.1126/science.aba2932
 (6487), 138-140.368Science 
ARTICLE TOOLS http://science.sciencemag.org/content/368/6487/138
REFERENCES
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/368/6487/138#BIBL
This article cites 8 articles, 2 of which you can access for free
PERMISSIONS http://www.sciencemag.org/help/reprints-and-permissions
Terms of ServiceUse of this article is subject to the 
 is a registered trademark of AAAS.ScienceScience, 1200 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20005. The title 
(print ISSN 0036-8075; online ISSN 1095-9203) is published by the American Association for the Advancement ofScience 
Copyright © 2020, American Association for the Advancement of Science
o
n
 June 9, 2020
 
http://science.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
